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This thesis investigated the number of In-Flight-Tech-
nicians assigned to a Navy P3C squadron, their contributions
to the squadron's ASW capability in their dual roles as in-
flight and ground repairmen, and the adequacy of the In-
Flight-t"aintenance-Kit. Tradeoffs between the number of
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ground and airborne utilization. Potential benefits associ-
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In these times of increasingly scarce and expensive
resources, managers at all levels in any organization must
concern themselves with ensuring the most productive use
of men, money and material. This challenge is applicable
to the Naval manager as well as his counterpart in the
civilian business community. This paper examines the
utilization of the Navy's most valuable asset, manpower,
and investigates various methods of manpower employment
in one segment of the Naval community.
B. AIRBORNE ANTI-SUBMARINE-'d&RFARE AND THE P3C AIRCRAFT
United States airborne Anti-Submarine-Warfare (A37J)
missions are conducted using two types of aircraft; fixed
wing and rotary wing (helicopters). Fixed v/ing ASW aircraft
operate from both land bases and aircraft carriers. The P3C
is the Navy's primary fixed wing ASV/ aircraft operating
from land bases.
The P3C Orion is today's most sophisticated airborne
ASW weapon system. Developed by Lockheed Aircraft Corpora-
tion, the P3C is a military adaptation of Lockheed's commer-
cial airliner, the 'Electra' . The four engine turbo-prop
configuration and its advanced communications and navigations
systems allow operation of the aircraft in all types of
weather from nearly any type of airfield. It is a long

range, long endurance aircraft with a normal ASVJ mission
time of ten hours although twelve hour flights are not
uncommon. The primary mission of the P3C , as stated by
Naval Instruction
, is to search out, localize, track and,
if necessary, destroy enemy submarines. Its secondary
mission is surveillance and tracking of enemy surface units.
The P3C is also designed to be relatively self-sufficient
to the point that it may operate for short periods of time,
usually up to two weeks, from advanced bases where the only
items available are fuel, oil and a runway.
The crew of the aircraft, stated in the P3C Natops
Flight Manual
, includes three pilots, one of whom is the
Patrol Plane Commander who is responsible for the safe and
successful completion of the mission. Additionally there
are three sensor equipment operators, two flight engineers,
an ordnance man, a Navigations/Communications officer, an
in-flight electronics repairman and a Tactical Coordinator
who is responsible for target prosecution including data
evaluation and strategy selection.
C. MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AND REQUIREMENTS
Nine P3Cs are assigned to each of the Navy's Patrol
Squadrons. The squadrons, headed by the Commanding and
Executive Officers, are organized into three departments:
1OPNAVINST C $kh2. to, Subject: Aircraft Material Condi -
^
ions, Standards and Mi ssion Essential Sub-Sy s tems List
,
1^ !• arch 1 -?5«
2Natops Flight Manual, Navy Model P3C Aircraft .
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Operations, Administration, and Maintenance. The Mainte-
nance Department acts as a service organization; its pur-
pose is to provide operationally capable aircraft to the
Operations Department for assignment to A3W flight operations.
As aircraft material malfunctions arise the Maintenance
Department strives to correct the discrepancies as rapidly
as possible. The more expeditiously that repairs are
effected by the Maintenance Department the higher the degree
of aircraft availability for operational assignment. Effi-
cient personnel utilization is a must for the Maintenance
Department to fulfill its requirements. This investigation
is concerned v/ith one aspect of personnel utilization within
the Maintenance Department and examines the impact of per-
sonnel allocation on the squadron's ability to conduct ASW
operations.
There are three levels of maintenance prescribed in the
Naval Aviation Maintenance Program-": Organizational, Inter-
mediate, and Depot. Organizational Level maintenance is
performed on-board the aircraft by squadron Maintenance
Department personnel and is usually the least sophisticated
of the three levels. The Maintenance Department is organized
into six primary Work Centers, each with a separate area of
responsibility. The Work Centers, their areas of responsibility,
and enlisted ratings assigned are displayed in Table 1-1.
It should be noted that Work Centers 210 and X-20 are staffed
-^OPNAVINST 4790.2, Subject: Naval Aviation Maintenance
Program
, 18 June, 1973.
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Patrol Squadron Work Center Organization
Work Center
EnlistedNumber Name Areas of
Rates Responsibility
110 Powerplants ADJ Engines, propellers
120 Airframes AMS AIvlH Aircraft structures,
hydraulics
210 Avionics AT AX Airborne electronics
systems
220 Electric AE Electrical and
instruments systems
230 Ordnance AO Weapons carriage and
release systems
X-20 In-Flight AT AX Airborne electronics
Technicians systems
Table 1-1
by the same enlisted rates and each performs maintenance
on the P3C ' s airborne electronics or 'avionics' systems.
However, there are very definite differences between the
two Work Centers.
The primary difference is the location of work perform-
ance. System malfunctions repaired on the ground are
corrected by Work Center 210 personnel; those repaired in-
flight are corrected by personnel from Work Center X-20.
The second difference is the qualification of the person-
nel assigned to the Work Centers. Work Center X-20 is manned
by the electronics repairman (AT or AX rating) assigned to
each flight crew, commonly called the 'in-flight technician 1
or IFT. His pay grade must be E-5 or above and prior to
12

squadron assignment he receives thirteen weeks of extensive
it
training on the repair of the P3C avionics systems . Since
he is in a flight status the IFT also receives flight pay.
Work Center 210 is partially manned by permanently assigned
personnel with the same rating as those in Work Center X-20.
However, there is no requirement that they be E-5 or above,
they do not receive flight pay and their pre-squadron train-
ing is far less extensive than that of the IFTs. To complete
the manning of Work Center 210, IFTs not engaged in flight
operations are assigned to the Work Center to augment the
permanently assigned ground personnel. Thus P3C avionics
maintenance at the Organizational Level is performed by
two groups, IFTs and ground personnel, with IFTs being the
more costly of these two manpower resources because of their
pay grades, flight pay and added training. Each squadron
has the option of varying the allocation of IFTs between Work
Centers X-20 and 210 by choosing different policies regarding
their airborne utilization (the less 'an IFT flies the more
he is available to Work Center 210).
D. PURPOSE
This thesis investigated the utilization of avionics
repair personnel employed in the maintenance of the P3C
system. The purpose of the investigation was to estimate
the allocation of avionics maintenance manpower which
NAVEDTRA 10500 Vol. Ill, C-102-3575, Subjects Catalogue
of Navy Training Courses .
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maximized the operational capability of a typical P3C
squadron. Specifically, the squadron-level allocation of
IFT effort in airborne and ground repairs was examined to
determine if an optimal allocation existed. This thesis
also considered changes in avionics resource allocations
beyond the scope of the squadron-level decision maker.
These changes included: making additional spare parts
available to the IFT v/hile airborne to enhance his repair
effort, altering the mix of IFTs and ground personnel
assigned to each squadron, and assigning IFTs to Inter-







The various methods of utilization of the Maintenance
Department's avionics maintenance personnel fell into two
general categories: use within the squadron and use out-
side of the squadron. The alternatives within each of
these categories were evaluated in order to enhance the
squadron's mission performing capability by improving the
allocation of avionics maintenance personnel.
B. AVIONICS MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL UTILIZATION WITHIN THE
SQUADRON
In the short run the only change possible for the
squadron is the re-allocation of its available personnel.
Ground avionics personnel receive no in-flight maintenance
training which restricts their use to ground maintenance.
However, the allocation of IFT time may be varied, at the
squadron's option-3
, between ground and in-flight maintenance.
The allocation of IFT use is determined by the selection of
a policy regarding the types of flights on which he is re-
quired to fly. The amount of time that IFTs are available
for performing ground maintenance varies inversely with
their utilization in-flight. Therefore, the short run
^COMFAIRWINGSPAC INSTRUCTION ^790.?, Subject: P3C AS IV




options available to the squadron for utilization of its
avionics maintenance personnel range from IFT use solely
in the air to assignment of IFTs to Work Center 210 only
and all the possible mixes between these extremes.
Even though the IFT is the only asset whose use may be
varied in the short run, it must be noted that in the long
run the composition of the entire avionics work force could
be altered. Thus, changes in ground avionics personnel
utilization may also be considered. This is especially
important since the ground avionics worker, who does not
receive flight pay or additional training, is a less
expensive resource than the IFT. The long term alternatives
for avionics personnel utilization involves tradeoffs
between the numbers of IFTs and ground maintenance per-
sonnel assigned to a squadron. The extremes of the possible
tradeoffs are a Maintenance Department avionics work force
composed entirely of IFTs or entirely of ground personnel.
C. AVIONICS MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL UTILIZATION OUTSIDE
OF THE SQUADRON
Since policies regarding assignment of ground personnel
outside of the squadron already exist, this thesis only
addressed the potential for IFT utilization beyond Organi-
zational Level maintenance. Because all P3C systems
maintenance including that at the Intermediate and Depot






Levels enhances the aircraft's ASW capability and the
squadron's operational effectiveness and since the IFT
receives different and more extensive training than ground
avionics maintenance personnel, the possible gains
in ASW capability associated with IFT assignment to these
maintenance levels were examined. The alternatives avail-
able ranged between the extremes of leaving all of the
IFTs in the squadron and assigning none to Depot or Inter-
mediate Level maintenance activities to the assignment of
all of the IFTs to maintenance billets outside of the
squadrons. The two maintenance levels were examined in-
dependently and no investigations were conducted regarding




III. AVIONICS MAINTENANCE PROCESS AND THE P3C
A. THE IFT AMD THE P3C
The most significant advance in ASW capability associ-
ated with fleet introduction of the P3C is the improved
efficiency of time utilization resulting from incorporation
of a computerized data processing package into the aircraft's
avionics system. ASW missions with the fixed-wing predeces-
sor of the P3C required approximately eighty-five percent of
the aircrew's operational flight time for charting courses,
plotting targets, keeping logbooks and processing data while
only fifteen percent of their time was available for strategy
selection and decision making. With the advent of the speed
and handling capacity of the P3C's data processing equip-
ment the ratio of time utilization during an operational
evolution has been reversed; eighty-five percent of the on
station time is now available for strategy selection and
decision making.
In order for the P3C*s data handling system to accomplish
such a drastic improvement in time utilization efficiency
it was necessary to tie virtually all of the aircraft's
avionics systems to the central data processing package.
As a result of this linking of systems, system maintainability
became critically important since a single malfunction could
have repercussions throughout the aircraft. To improve
system reliability the avionics components were designed
18

for in-flight maintainability and the IFT was added to
the normal operating flight crew. To facilitate IFT
repair work, additional test equipment was built into
the aircraft. The total system was further engineered to
permit automatic testing using the aircraft's own computer.
In addition to test capabilities aboard the aircraft, an
in-flight maintenance kit was also placed aboard in order
to supply needed replacement parts and additional test
equipment.
The IFT fills two roles in which he contributes to the
squadron's operational capability. In the air as a member
of Work Center X-20 the IFT has the training, the test
facilities and the spare parts to repair many avionics
discrepancies which degrade an aircraft's ASW capability,
thus allowing completion of the mission. When assigned to
Work Center 210 on the ground the IFT enhances the squadron's
mission performing capability by increasing the number of
aircraft available for mission assignment through his
repairs to the avionics systems. When assigned to Work
Center 210, the IFT, because of his higher rate, training,
and experience level, serves as a part time Work Center
supervisor and is instrumental in maintaining Work Center
efficiency and effective on-the- job-training for newer
avionics personnel.
B. MEASUREMENT OF WORKER OUTPUT
The IFT documents his work output in the same manner
as other Maintenance Department personnel, by completing a
19

Maintenance Action Form (Appendix A) for each repair
he performs. The man-hours he expends in the air are
credited to Work Center X-20, those on the ground to
Work Center 210. The worker output of Work Centers X-20
and 210, as v/ell as the other Maintenance Department Work
Centers, is currently determined by measuring the number
of man-hours each Work Center member documents each month.
While this determination is easy to make, it does not give
a true indication of worker output, particularly for Work
Centers X-20 and 210, because it fails to relate that
output to the squadron's mission performing capability.
For example, assume two workers, A and B, work four hours
and one hour respectively. Measuring man-hours indicates
that worker A is the greater producer. However, assume
further that he repaired a relatively insignificant mal-
function whereas worker B corrected a discrepancy that had
rendered the aircraft completely inoperative. Clearly
worker B has done more for the squadron's mission perform-
ing capability even though he worked only one hour. Addition-
ally, since IFTs and ground avionics personnel received
different training and therefore work on different avionics
systems, the measurement of their work effort by examination
of man-hours is even more misleading. To better measure
worker output and to relate that work to mission performing
capability, it was necessary to consider both the number
of malfunctions a worker repairs and the significance of




C. A MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
1. Objective of Investigation
The objective of this investigation was to determine
how a P3C squadron's mission performing capability may be
enhanced through the most effective utilization of its
avionics maintenance personnel. The squadron's mission
performing capability is a direct function of the number
of AS'.V capable aircraft available for operational use. As
operational missions were flown the aircraft experienced
system discrepancies which reduced aircraft ASW capability.
ASW capability lost through avionics systems malfunctions
was recovered through repair of those malfunctions, either
in-flight or on the ground, by squadron avionics maintenance
personnel.
2. Development of the Treasure of Effectiveness
a. General
The Measure of Effectiveness was developed to
evaluate the contribution of the avionics maintenance
process to the squadron's mission performing capability.
To do so it was necessary to establish a relationship
between the maintenance effort and the squadron's ASW
capability. Since avionics maintenance contributes to the
squadron's ASW capability by restoring lost ASW capability
through malfunctions repaired it was necessary to determine
how many system discrepancies were repaired and how much
21

capability was recovered by those repairs.
b. Assumptions
Since information was gathered from different
organizational units, the following assumptions were made
to ensure the comparability of the organizations:
(1) Quality of Maintenance . The same quality
of maintenance was expected at different organizations.
This implies that a particular Maintenance Department,
because of the faulty initial repair of a malfunction,
would not be expected to recover an unusually high degree
of ASW capability through repeated repair of the same mal-
function.
(2) Distribution of Malfunction Significance .
The same distribution of the significance of malfunctions
was expected to occur at different organizations. This
implies that a given activity would not recover greater
ASW capability than another merely because it experienced
a greater proportion of malfunctions that critically affected
an aircraft's ASW capability.
c. Presentation of the Measure of Effectiveness
To evaluate the gain in squadron mission per-
forming capability due to avionics maintenance it was
necessary to examine the impact of each repair on ASW
capability and to total that impact over all repairs. The
Equivalent Aircraft Unit (EAU) was developed to serve as
the unit of measurement. If two malfunctions, each causing
a 507° ASW capability degradation were repaired then those
22

repairs recovered one EAU. The EAU then is a measure of
the number of repairs and the significance of the systems
repaired.
Based on the above assumptions that the same
quality of maintenance is expected at each activity and that
each activity experiences the same distribution of the sig-
nificance of its malfunctions, an increase in the number
of EAUs recovered indicates a greater Maintenance Depart-
ment contribution to the squadron's ASW capability.
3. Advantages and Limitations
As a measure of effectiveness the EAU is superior
to a simple calculation of maintenance man-hours. The EAU
gives a direct indication of the maintenance contribution
to squadron mission performing capability. Man-hours of
maintenance performed are not related to ASW capability.
However, there are two limitations associated with
use of the EAU as a measure of effectiveness:
a. Malfunction Independence
Each malfunction was treated as an independent
event. The ASW capability restored by the repair of a
malfunction was independent of the concurrent existence of
other discrepancies. This treatment v/as implemented to
avoid the complexity of simultaneous evaluation of all mal-
functions existing on an aircraft. This simplification
eliminated the direct relationship between maintenance
actions and individual aircraft capability. However, there
still exists a direct relationship between maintenance and
23

total squadron ASW capability. For example, the repair
of an aircraft's radar system may recover .5 EAUs for the
squadron even though the aircraft in which it is installed
is in a non-flyable status due to an engine malfunction.
The essence of this limitation is that EAUs are recovered
on a system by system basis, not on an aircraft by aircraft
basis. Even though the ASW capability of that aircraft
v/as not actually enhanced, after the repair the squadron
had one additional operable radar system available for use
on another aircraft.
b. Rate of Recovery of ASW Capability
The elapsed time between the occurrence and the
repair of a malfunction was not a factor in the measure of
effectiveness. Thus no evaluation can be made regarding
the rate with which EAUs were recovered. A repair performed
on the day that the malfunction occurred v/as treated the
same as an identical repair that was completed days after
the malfunction was discovered, even though the ASW capability
was lost for a longer period of time.
2h

IV DEVELOPMENT OF MALFUNCTION DATA
A. DATA SOURCES
1. The Maintenance Action Form
The basic documentary source for maintenance
related malfunction data is the Maintenance Action Form
(MAF). The MAF is utilized by Organizational Level mainte-
nance units to establish a basic record of each malfunction
and the related action that occurs. The information re-
corded on a MAF includes a brief discription of the malfunction,
the part numbers of any components replaced, v/hen the mal-
function was discovered (i.e. in the air or on the ground),
the work center responsible for the corrective action and
the signatures of the personnel v/ho accomplished the correc-
tive maintenance. A complete description of the information
contained in a MAF is included in Appendix A. After the
corrective action is completed, the MAF is retained by the
unit responsible for organizational level maintenance. The
P3C maintenance and malfunction information is maintained
by the squadron which is responsible for Organizational
Level maintenance.
2. Squadron Operating Policies
Two P3C squadrons provided access to their MAF files
in support of this investigation. During the course of
data collection it became apparent that the two squadrons
utilized different IFT allocation policies. As this thesis
compared the effectiveness of those policies, the squadrons
were identified as "Squadron A" and "Squadron B" in order
25

to preserve their anonymity. Squadron A had elected to
fly their IFTs only on operational (AS';/) missions, thus
causing the IFTs to spend the bulk of their time working
on the ground as part of work center 210. Squadron B elected
to maximize the IFTs' airborne time by requiring an IFT to
fly on all flights regardless of the mission. This policy
resulted in less IFT time on the ground in Work Center 210.
In order to determine why the squadrons differed
in their utilization of IFTs, discussions were held with
representatives of each squadron. Representatives of
Squadron A revealed that they felt more could be gained by
having the IFTs available for use in Work Center 210 than
flying him on all flights because the only time that the
IFT could be useful in the air was when ASW related equip-
ment was utilized. This occurred only on operational flights.
Representatives of Squadron B felt that ASW related equip-
ment could be tested on all flights, including non^operation-
al ones, and therefore IFTs should be aboard the aircraft
for all flights.
3. Summary of Data
The data was collected from each Squadron's records
spanning a two month period for each of their nine aircraft.
January and February of 1975 were selected since each squadron
agreed that those months were typical of the squadrons normal
operating environments.
Over 1100 MPs were examined of which 715 were con-
sidered relevant for analytical purposes. The remainder in-
volved * trouble- shooting' and 'Cannibalization' action.
26

Cannibalization is the exchange of defective equipment
of one aircraft with operable equipment from another air-
craft while trouble-shooting simply diagnoses a malfunction.
Such actions may provide immediate improvement in squadron
ASW capability or shorten repair time but they do not repre-
sent a maintenance contribution since the original malfunction
is not repaired but merely transfered to another aircraft
or put off until later.
Malfunctions were discovered either in-flight or
while the aircraft was on the ground. Table IV-1 displays
the number of malfunctions for each squadron and the air-
craft's environment when the malfunction was discovered.
Those malfunctions discovered in the air represent the
number of opportunities that the IFTs had to immediately
increase the aircrafts ASW capability.
AVIONICS RELATED MALFUNCTION DISTRIBUTION





Table IV-2 presents a comparison of the malfunctions,
expressed in percent, for both squadrons. It is apparent
that the percentages of ground versus air discovered mal-
functions is approximately the same for both squadrons.
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PERCENTAGE OF GROUND VS AIR DISCOVERED MALFUNCTIONS
Aircraft Environment Squadron A Squadron B
Ground 58$ 5W
Air k2 c/o k6fo
TOTALS 100^ 100^
Table IV-2
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF MALFUNCTIONS
1. Malfunction Significance Categories
Further utilization of the data required the develop-
ment of a procedure to determine the degree of ASW capability
restored through the repair of a given discrepancy. This
determination is an expression of the significance of the
work done. Six significant categories were defined that
ranged from to 100/2 ASW degradation due to avionics re-
lated malfunctions. Six categories provided a small enough
range within each category (16.7$) to yield a reasonably
precise indicator of lost ASW capability but the category
definitions were sufficiently broad to facilitate determina-
tion of the significance of specific malfunctions. While
the range of ASW degradation around each category made it
easier to categorize a given malfunction, the range was not
satisfactory for analytical purposes. A specific percentage
value, the midpoint of the range, was used to evaluate the
significance of the malfunction. Table IV-3 displays the
Malfunction Significance Categories, the range of lost ASW
capability and the midpoint of each range associated with
28

each Category. A malfunction placed in Category Two would
indicate that the malfunction caused a loss of 16. 7 to 33
«
^%
of the aircraft's ASW capability. Conversely, repair of






One Minor .01-16.? 8.35
Two Moderate 16. 7 -33.^ 25.05
Three Substantial 33.4 -50.
1
41.75
Four Serious 50.1 -66.8 58.45
Five Critical 66.8 -83.5 75.15
Six Catastrophic 83.6 -100 91.75
Table IV-3
2. Personnel Utilized in Malfunction Significance
Categorization
It v/as decided that the P3C operators were the best
qualified personnel to perform the categorization process.
Two groups were selected to act as classifiers, IFTs and
TACCOs. The IFTs were selected because of their expertise
in regard to each system and the TACCOs because of their
understanding of the interrelationship between various
systems and the aircraft's mission performing capabilities.
A panel of six TACCOs and six IFTs were selected from the
two squadrons which provided data.
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3» Consolidating and Testing Opinion .
a. Consolidating Opinion
Each malfunction was independently classified
by each of the twelve panel members. They v/ere given
access to all relevant information except which squadron •
experienced the malfunction. When the panel was unable
to reach a unanimous opinion as to the correct category
for a given malfunction, the approximate category was se-
lected on the basis of the average category classification
of the twelve respondents. For example, if in the opinion
of ten members, a particular malfunction was 'Minor'
(Category One) and the remaining two members felt that it
was more appropriately 'Moderate* (Category Two) then the
average of the opinions would lie somewhere between Category
One and Category Two, specifically 1.33; (8(l)+4(2)/l2)
.
Since 1.33 lies closer to Category One than Category Two,
the malfunction v/ould have been placed in Category One.
Anytime that a malfunction had to be averaged it was placed
into the nearest category. A malfunction determined to be
exactly halfway between two categories was placed in the
higher category of the tv/o.
b. Testing Opinion
The possibility existed that the twelve opinions
for a single malfunction would be spread across several of
the categories available so that the average classification
of the malfunction would not be valid. For example, if two
responses placed a malfunction in Category One, tv/o more in
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Category Two, two in Category Three... all the way to
Category Six such that the same malfunction had been
listed twice in each of the six categories, the average
for that malfunction would be computed to be Category
Four. Using Category Four to represent the value for the
significance of ASW degradation would be questionable since
ten of the twelve respondents felt it belonged in another
category. To ascertain that the above phenomenon had not
occurred, a "goodness of opinion" test was designed. A
randomly selected sample of malfunctions was examined to
determine if the dispersion of responses for a given mal-
function was so spread out among the six malfunction cate-
gories that identifying that malfunction with a specific
significance category v/as erroneous. Another test was
conducted to determine if the midpoint of a category (i.e.
one, two, etc.) could be used as an estimator of the averaged
opinions for a specific malfunction. Both hypotheses were
accepted at the 95^ significance level. Details of both
tests and the sample of malfunctions considered are discussed
in Appendix B.
c. Categorization of Data
Table IV-4 displays the Malfunction Significance
Categories and the number of malfunctions for each squadron
that were placed in those categories. It should be noted
that in no case did the average of the respondents opinions
place a malfunction in Category Six. Therefore, Category




SUMMARY OF MALFUNCTIONS BY MALFUNCTION SIGNIFICANCE CATEGORY
CATEGORY SQUADRON A SQUADRON B COMBINED
One 28 22 50
Two 112 102 214
Three 165 133 298
Four ^7 36 83
Five 42 28 70
Six
TOTALS 39^ 321 715
Table IY-4
C. COMPARABILITY OF DATA SOURCES
Since data were obtained from two different squadrons,
it was possible that basic differences existed which could
significantly bias the apparent relative effectiveness of
the two squadrons' maintenance programs. Differences in
the proportion of significant malfunctions could permit
one squadron's maintenance effort to appear more valuable
by repairing more serious malfunctions. Also, differences
in the total number of malfunctions experienced by each
squadron could give the same false impression of relative
maintenance productivity.
1. Distribution of Malfunctions In The Significance
Categories
It was assumed that each squadron wo aid experience
the same relative numbers of malfunctions in each significance
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category. To test the assumption the hypothesis was
developed that there is no significant difference "between
percentage of malfunctions per category betv/een Squadron
A and Squadron B. Table IV-5 shows for each squadron
the percentage of the total malfunctions experienced by •
that squadron that occurred in each category.
DISTRIBUTION OF MALFUNCTIONS {%)
SIGNIFICANCE CATEGORY
o^ ununun
1 2 3 4 5
A 7.0 28.4 41.8 11.9 10.6
B 6.8 31.8 41.4 11.2 8.7
c/> Difference 0.2 3.4 0.4 0.7 1.9
Table IV-5
The last row of Table IV-5, % Difference, displays
the difference between squadrons in the percent of mal-
functions per category. Through the use of the Chi-Square
Test that difference was tested (Appendix C). It was found
that the difference between the distribution of malfunctions
in each category was not significant at the 95f° level.
Therefore, the assumption that each squadron experienced
the same relative number of malfunctions per significance
category was supported.
2. Adjustment to the Total Halfunctions Per Squadron
Since Squadron B experienced fewer malfunctions
than Squadron A, (321 vs 394), the direct comparison of EAU
recovered by the various groups (i.e. IFTs) would have been
misleading due to the higher opportunity to repair malfunctions
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in Squadron A. In order for the comparison of utilization
of personnel in the two squadrons to be meaningful, the
malfunctions data for squadron B was adjusted in each
significance category to yield the same total number
of malfunctions as experienced by Squadron A. Table IV-6,
Adjusted Malfunctions, represents the normalization of the
malfunctions in each category for Squadron B to make the
total number of malfunctions in that squadron equal to the








One 28 22 27
Two 112 102 125
Three 165 133 164
Four 4? 36 44
Five 42 28 34
TOTALS 39^ 321 394
Table IV-6
Notes:
(1) Adjusted Malfunctions = Actual x 394/321.
(2) Rounded off to nearest whole number.
Throughout the remainder of this thesis the adjusted number
of malfunctions for Squadron B were used to compute EAUs
recovered when comparisons of the two squadrons' personnel
utilization policies were being made. Any time general comp-
arisons of overall squadron policy were being made the actual
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V. DERIVATION OF EQUIVALENT AIRCRAFT UNITS
A. EQUIVALENT AIRCRAFT UNIT (EAU) CONCEPT.
1. Components of The EAU Concept
The traditional manhours accounting system attempted
to measure a worker's productive effort by the number of
hours worked. The EAU concept combines the significance
and the amount of the work that is done and then expresses
the result as the number of EAUs recovered. Simply stated
the EAUs recovered are a function of the significance of
a malfunction and the number of malfunctions recovered.
Those two components are defined as follows:
a. Significance of a Malfunction (S)
The higher the Malfunction Category into which
a malfunction is placed the more significant the work that
corrected the malfunction. The Malfunction Significance
Table (Table IV-3) represented the EAUs that v/ould be recov-
ered for a single malfunction in each category. From Table
IV-3 it is found that the repair of a single Category One
malfunction (Minor) would recover .0835 EAUs.
b. Number of Malfunctions (N)
.
Table IV-6 displayed the other component of the
EAU concept, namely the number of malfunctions (N) in a
given significance category.
2. Computing An EAU
Based on the two components, Significance (S) and
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the number of malfunctions (N), the EAU for a given
Significance Category was computed as follows:
EAU = S x N (Equation V-l)
For example, the EAUs recovered in Squadron B by the
correction of all Category Two malfunctions (adjusted) would
be found by multiplying the significance of a Category Two
malfunction (S ? ) times the number of Category Two malfunctions













Therefore, the EAUs recovered by the Avionics Work Center
in Squadron B due to the correction of Category Two mal-
functions was 31 '3 EAUs.
B. EVALUATING THE CONTRIBUTION OF A WORK GROUP
1. Contribution of A Work Group
The contribution of a particular work group (i.e.
permanent ground personnel or In-Flight Technicians) was
determined by establishing the proportion of malfunction
repairs attributed to that group. The determination of the
proportion of repairs was made by examining all of the MAFs
within each Malfunction Category and noting, according to
the worker's signature, who performed the work, an IFT or
Permanent Ground Personnel (PGP). There are two signature
blocks on a T«!AF that had to be examined, one for the worker
and one for the supervisor. The assumption was made that
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the worker and the supervisor contributed equally to the
repair. Interviews of squadron maintenance personnel
supported the validity of this assumption. The proportion
of malfunctions (Q) repaired by a particular work group
was established by dividing the number of signatures found
on the MAFs for that group by the total number of signatures
for workers of all the groups:
Q (worker group) = Signatures of that Group ( tion V-2 )to *
' Total Signatures Recorded v H '
The determination of Q for Squadron B's PGP working in
Category Two would be found by counting the number of
PGP signatures (44) on the MAFs in that category and
dividing that by the total number of Category Two sig-
natures (72):
QPGP = 44 t 72 = .61
Therefore, the proportion of work attributable to Squadron
B's PGP by the repair of Category Two malfunctions was
.61.
Q was computed for each work group of interest
and listed by squadron and significance category in
Table V-l.
2. Computing EAUs Recovered By a Work Group
Equation V-l allowed the computation of EAUs re-
covered. Equation V-2 computed the proportion of work
attributable to a particular work group. Combining both
equations into Equation V~3 allowed the coirnitation of the
EAUs recovered by a specific group of personnel:
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Mai Repair Repair Totals












28 .375 .483 .142
112 .331 • 598 .071
165 • 379 .481 .140
47 .298 • 574 .128
42 • 369 .440 .191
(SQUADRON B)
22 .182 • 773 .045
102 .239 .731 .030
133 .320 .635 .045
36 • 377 .623














EAUs RECOVERED BY PGP AND IFTs
IN THE REPAIR OF AVIONICS i.ALFUNCTIONS
Malfunction Ground Repair In-Plight Total EAUs/Wrk Grp
Category Repair
IFT PGP IFT IFT PGP
(SQUADRON A)
1 0.877 1.129 0.332 1.209 1.129
2 9.287 16.777 1.992 11.279 16.777
3 26.108 33.135 9.644 35.752 33.135
4 8.817 15.769 3.516 12.333 15.769
5 11 . 647 13.888 6.029 17.676 13.888




1 0.4-10 1.743 0.101 0.511 1.743
2 7.484 22.889 0.939 8.423 22.889
3 21.910 43.478 3. 081 24.991 43.478
4 9.696 16.022 0.000 9.696 16.022
5 7-742 16.889 0.920 8.662 16.889
TOTALS 47.242 101.021 5.041 52.283 101.021
(SQUADRON B, UNADJUSTED)
1 0.334 1.420 0.083
. 417 1.420
2 6.107 I8.678 0.767 6.874 I8.678
3 17.769 35.260 2.499 20.265 35.260
4 7.933 13.109 0.0 7.933 13.109
5 6.776 13.909 0.758 7 • ] 34 13.909




EAU, . v = S x N x Q (Equation V-3)(work group) H
Q is taken from the appropriate category in Table V-l. To
determine the EAUs recovered by FGPs in Squadron B by the
repair of Category Two malfunction Equation V-3 was used
as follows:
EAUpQp = S 2 x N2 x Q 2
EAUpQp = (25.05) (102) (.731)
EAUpGp =18.7
Therefore, Squadron B's PGP recovered 18. 7 EAUs by the
repair of Category Two malfunctions. Table IV-2 represents
the EAUs recovered by the PGPs and IFTs (both in work center
210 and X20) for Squadron A and Squadron B.
C. THE VALUE OF IN-FLIGHT REPAIRS
1. Rationale For Increasing the Value of In-Flight
Repairs
Table V-2 displayed the EAUs recovered by IFTs
working while airborne. Those figures may not be meaning-
ful for all levels of squadron management. For example,
a discrepancy that occurs and is repaired in the air during
the prosecution of a submarine could very well have far
greater value to the flight crew and the Commanding Officer
than it would if fixed on the ground. Conversations with
squadron Commanding Officers revealed that they do place
more value on the repair of a discrepancy in-flight. In
order to consider this added worth when investigating IFT
work output at the Squadron Level an upward adjustment was
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made to the values associated with each Malfunction Category.
2. Estimating The Value
To establish the needed adjustments it was necessary
to determine the Commanding Officers' perceptions of the added
value of in-flight repairs within each Category. An index
of this added worth was developed through the use of a modi-
n
fied Delphi Technique. An initial estimate was made by
providing both squadron Commanding Officers with a list of
the various Malfunction Categories and asking each to separ-
ately give his best estimate of how much more each Malfunction
Category was worth to him if repaired in-flight. The Command-
ing Officers were then presented with their opposite' s esti-
mate and, without being informed who the other 'expert' was,
were allowed to adjust their initial figures. This process
was repeated until they agreed to the additional worth for
each Malfunction Significance Category. Table V-3 displays
the results of this process.
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In applying this index, the EAUs recovered in a particular
in-flight Significance Category were multiplied by the
appropriate index value. For example, the worth of the
in-flight repair of a Significance Category Three mal-
function is four times the EAUs recovered by the repair of
that same malfunction on the ground.
It must be noted that only two Commanding Officers
v/ere available to participate in the Delphi process. The
result obtained has limited quantitative application, but
does serve to illustrate the magnitude of the value of
in-flight repairs.
3. Ad.justed EAUs for In-Flight Halfunction Repair
Table V-4 displays the adjustment made to the EAUs
recovered in-flight to reflect the additional value those
repairs may represent to the Commanding Officer. Because
of their limited quantitative validity, value-adjusted
EAUs v/ere carefully identified v/hen used in later analysis,
^3

VALUE-ADJUSTED SAUs RECOVERED IN-FLIGHT
(SQUADRON A)
Malfunction Additional EAUs Recovered In-Plight
Categories Worth Unadjusted Adjusted
1 1 0.332 0.332
2 2 1.992 3-984
3 4 9.644 38.576
4 7 3-516 24.612





Malfunction Additional EAUs Recovered In-Flight
Categories Worth Unadjusted Adjusted
1 1 0.101 0.101
2 2 0.939 1.878
3 4 3. 081 12.324
4 7 0.0 0.0









The alternative uses for the Maintenance Department's
avionics maintenance personnel fell into two general cate-
gories: use within the squadron and use outside of the
squadron. The alternatives for use within the squadron
involved two separate areas, altering the IFT in-flight
utilization policy (short run alternatives) and changing
the composition of the entire Maintenance Department
avionics work force (long run alternatives). The informa-
tion collected during this investigation was evaluated to
determine each alternative's potential contribution to the
squadron's mission performing capability.
The study of avionics maintenance personnel use outside
of the squadron addressed only the IFT. The alternatives
for IFT use outside of the squadron consisted of the possible
mixes of IFT assignment between the squadron and Intermediate
Level maintenance activities and the squadron and Depot
Level maintenance activities. Since the Intermediate and
Depot Level maintenance information needed to estimate EAUs
was not readily available, the analysis of these alternatives
was qualitative in nature.
B. IFT IN-FLIGHT UTILIZATION POLICIES
The evaluation of the short run alternatives entailed
studying the IFT allocation between Work Centers 210 and
W

X-20 in order to determine how the Maintenance Department
may best contribute to the squadrons' mission performing
capability. Since the composition of the Maintenance
Department's avionics work force cannot be changed in the
short run, this was a constant cost problem in which various
IFT allocations were compared on the basis of EAUs recovered.
The IFT utilization methods followed by the two squadrons
that were studied offered an opportunity for a real-world
examination of the effectiveness of two differing IFT
allocation policies. Squadron A's IFT utilization policy
involved flying IFTs only on operational flights whereas
Squadron B chose to fly IFTs on virtually all missions.
Since IFT in-flight utilization (Work Center X-20) varies
inversely with their use in Work Center 210, Squadron A
had a greater number of IFTs available to perform ground
maintenance. The contribution of the IFT's within each
Maintenance Department to the squadron's ASW capability
was determined using the EAU as a measure of effectiveness.
The results are shown in Table VT-1. X-20 . represents
the in-flight contributions weighted through use of the
Commanding Officer's additional worth multiplier developed
in Chapter V and Total , represents the weighted IFT




IFT RECOVERED EAUs WEIGHTED AND UNstfEIGHTED




Squadron A 5&.7 21.8 127.8 78.5 184.5
Squadron B 47-2 5-0 23-5 52.2 70.7
The results clearly indicate the superiority of the
IFT allocation policy followed "by Squadron A. The most
surprising information in Table VI-1 is the unexpected
difference in the X-20 EAUs recovered between the squadrons.
This difference is further magnified after application of
the Commanding Officer's additional worth multiplier. The
low X-20 figure for Squadron B may best be explained as a
documentation problem. During the investigations conducted
at the squadron there were no indications that the squadron's
IFTs engaged in in-flight maintenance were performing at
an unacceptably low level. However, documentation of in-
flight maintenance has historically been a problem in many
squadrons. Most in-flight repairs involve adjustments or
alignment and take only a short time to accomplish. Since
documenting the work often consumes nearly as much time as
performing the repair, IFTs occasionally have had a tendency
to fail to complete MPs for quick repairs, even though
the repairs may be very significant in terms of recovered
capability.
It was expected that Squadron A IFTs working in Work
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Center 210 would provide a greater contribution to the
squadron's ASW capability since, because of the squadron's
IFT in-flight utilization policy, there were more IFTs
available for Work Center 210 assignment than in Squadron
B. This increased contribution did occur. It was also
expected that Squadron B, because of flying IFTs on all
flights, would experience a greater degree of recovered AS';/
capability through Work Center X-20 repairs. The intended
purpose of examining these two IFT utilization policies
was to see if the expected decrease in the contribution
made by Squadron B's IFTs in 'Work Center 210 would be
offset by the expected increase in the contribution made
by its additional IFTs in Work Center X-20 and how appli-
cation of the Commanding Officer's additional worth multi-
plier would affect the trade-off. However, since the ex-
pected increase in Squadron B's X-20 contribution was not
realized, no firm conclusions could be made regarding the
offsetting effects associated v/ith varying the allocation
of IFTs between Work Centers X-20 and 210.
C. CHANGES IN THE MIX OF IFTs AND PERMANENT GROUND PERSONNEL
1. General
In the long run the numbers of IFTs and ground
personnel within the Maintenance Department may be altered.
As both groups have the same background of basic avionics
training, many avionics repairs could be performed equally
well by either group. However, IFTs, are a more expensive
resource than ground personnel because of their higher pay
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grades, flight pay, and additional training costs. Thus,
if the ratio of ground personnel to IFTs could be changed
by increasing the proportion of ground personnel v/ithout
degrading the Maintenance Department's contribution to
the squadron's mission performing capability then this
change would result in a more efficient use of Navy manpower.
2 . Analysis of Changes to the IViix of IPT/Ground Personnel
To evaluate the effects of changes to the mix of
IFTs and ground personnel in Work Center 210 it v/as necessary
to establish a basis for comparison of the contributions
of individual workers. The average EAUs recovered per
worker v/as used for this comparison. Since the EAUs re-
covered by in-flight repairs will not be affected by a
change in the mix of IFTs and ground personnel as long as
a squadron is given enough IFTs to follow its IFT in-
flight utilization policy, EAUs recovered in the air were
not considered in this portion of the analysis.
There were 15 ground personnel assigned to Work
Center 210 in each squadron. There were 13 IFTs assigned
to each squadron but, because of the squadrons' differing
IFT in-flight utilization policies, the number of IFTs
available for assignment to Work Center 210 was not the
same in each squadron. The number of IFTs required for
use in Work Center X-20 is equal to the average number of
daily flights for those types of flights associated v/ith a
particular IFT in-flight utilization policy. For example,
squadron B flew IFTs on all flights and had a daily average
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of 5*11 flights, each requiring one IFT. Therefore, since
13 IFTs were assigned to the squadron, 7*89 were available
for utilization in Work Center 210.
The number of EAUs recovered per man in Work Center
210 was determined based on the actual number of malfunctions,
since the adjusted number of malfunctions developed for
Squadron B would misrepresent the actual productivity per
worker. Table VI-2 indicates the number of IFTs and PGPs
assigned to Work Center 210 in each squadron and the actual
number of EAUs recovered by each work group.
WORK CENTER 210 MANPOWER AND EAUs
Actual Manpower EAUs Recovered
ORGANIZATION IFTs PGP Total IFTs PGP Total
Squadron A 11.66 15 26.66 56.7 80. 7 137-
^
Squadron B 7-89 15 22.89 38.9 82.4 121.3
Squadron A & B 19-55 30 ^9-55 95-6 I63.I 258.7
Table VI-2
Utilizing the data from Table VI-2, the EAUs per
man were calculated for each work group in each squadron.
The resulting average productivity per man in various groups
is shown in Table VI-3. Analysis of the average productivity
per man indicated that Squadron B's Work Center 210 personnel,
with an output of 5*30 EAUs per man, were performing at a
higher level than those in Squadron A, whose output v/as
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5.15 EAUs per man. Two possible explanations for this
superior performance were considered.
EAUs PER MAN
Total Work Center IFT FGP









Combined Average 5.22 4.89 5.44
Table VI-3
First, Squadron B operated with a more efficient
mix of IFTs and ground personnel. Overall, IFTs recovered
4.89 EAUs per man while ground personnel recovered 5.kk
EAUs per man. This difference in productivity, when con-
sidered with the cost differential between IFTs and ground
personnel, indicated that an increase in the proportion of
ground personnel assigned to Work Center 210 would be more
cost effective. Squadron B's increase in the proportion
of ground personnel was accomplished through the reduction
of IFTs in Work Center 210 due to the policy of using IFTs
on all flights.
Second, Squadron B achieved a level of performance
closer to the capacity of its personnel. With fewer total
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personnel, Squadron 3's IFTs and ground personnel each
out-produced their counterparts in Squadron A. This in-
dicated that Work Center 210 personnel in Squadron A were
under-utilized compared to those personnel in Squadron B.
Hov/ever, this did not imply that Squadron B personnel were
producing at full capacity. In fact, further reduction in
IFTs assigned to Work Center 210 may have lead to additional
improvement in individual work output.
It appears that cost savings could be realized with-
out reducing maintenance capability through the replacement
of some IFTs with ground personnel. Since the analysis was
not sufficient to determine the workers' full capacity,
no numerical estimate could be made regarding the number
of IFTs to be replaced by ground personnel.
3. Other Considerations
Although the results of this analysis provide a
persuasive argument for reducing the number of IFTs assigned
to P3C squadrons, there are other factors which should be
considered before implementing such a change.
First, it must be noted that the EAUs per IFT and
ground avionics worker are representative of average, not
marginal, contributions to ASW capability. Thus, if a
squadron operated in the area of diminishing returns and
the average EAUs per ground worker v/as 5«^. one additional
worker would contribute less then $,kk EAUs. The data in-
dicated that for IFTs the squadrons were o r ;ing in the
area of diminishing returns. Squadron A, with an increased
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number of IFTs , experienced a decreased incremental con-
tribution to the squadron's mission performing capability.
This tended to support the recommendations to decrease the
number of IFTs available in Work Center 210. However, the
available data did not permit a determination of the in-
cremental contribution of ground personnel. Thus it was
not possible to show that the marginal returns of ground
personnel v/ere diminishing, constant, or increasing.
Second, before any substitutions of ground personnel
for IFTs can be considered, an examination must be made of
their relative capabilities. Since IFTs and ground per-
sonnel receive training on different portions of the avion-
ics systems, total substitution of IFTs and ground personnel
is not possible. Hov/ever, there is a great degree of
cross-training between IFTs and ground personnel which
diminishes the differences in their ground repair capabilities
An examination of ground repairs (Appendix D) indicated that
IFTs dominate the repair effort on only two portions of
the avionics systems. This appears to indicate that except
for those two sub-systems, ground avionics personnel are
as capable as IFTs. Hov/ever, this may be an inaccurate
representation of worker capabilities. The investigation
of system repairs was made by examining the two worker sig-
natures on the Maintenance Action Form filled out for each
repair. If the repair was performed by a ground worker and
an IFT, each was assumed to possess the same capability on
that system. This may not be true because one worker could
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have been training another far less capable man. There-
fore, before any definite worker substitutions are con-
sidered, a closer examination of the requirements for work
skills is necessary.
Third, there must be sufficient IFTs assigned to
a squadron to man the maximum number of flights as dictated
by the squadron's operating policy. This places a floor
on the number of IFTs that may be deleted from the squadron's
manning requirements and replaced by ground personnel.
Finally, there is an additional barrier to decreasing
the number of squadron IFTs. It is known as the 'crew con-
cept'. Historically, the P3C aircrew, including the IFT,
has been viewed as a team that operates as a unit with each
member av/are of his teammates shortcomings and strong points.
Since there are eleven crews per squadron it may not be likely
that a Commanding Officer would endorse the assignment of
less than eleven IFTs, one permanently attached to each
aircrew.
D. THE IN-FLIGHT MAINTENANCE KIT
1 . Background
The introduction of the P3C aircraft with its self-
test, computerized ASW systems established elevated stan-
dards of maintainability and reliability within the P3
community. This unique weapon system also ushered in a
new philosophy of avionics and related systems maintenance,
the pull-out and plug- in or "modular repair" process. The
emergence of the "modular repair" concept led to the
5k

instatement of IFTs as flight crew members and to the
placement of onboard spare parts (spare modules) aboard
the P3C aircraft. This onboard supply of spare parts was
labeled the "in-Flight Maintenance Kit" (IFMK). The .
inventory of the IFMK dictates, to a great degree, the
effectiveness of the IFT during airborne missions. With
a well engineered IFMK and a skilled IFT aboard the air-
craft, the Patrol Plane Commander should be fairly
confident that he will successfully complete his ASW
mission in spite of normal avionics hardware malfunctions.
The inventory of the IFMK is very important. The cost of
training an IFT plus the added expense of his flight pay
substantiates the need for supplying him with the assets
necessary to be as productive as possible in the air.
The Initial Outfitting List for kits such as the IFMK is
usually based upon failure rates projected by the system
manufacturers and is normally adjusted later after opera-
tional failure rates have been established.
2. Analysis of In-Flight Malfunctions
This analysis utilized only those malfunctions in-
volving the removal and replacement of a piece of electronics
equipment or a component part. Such malfunctions can be
identified by the indication of a part number on the IIAF.
Maintenance actions such as trouble-shooting , adjusting,
tuning and cleaning do not involve component replacement.
The malfunctions identified for this analysis, displayed
in Table 111-12, show that there were a total of 381 avionics
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malfunctions in both squadrons involving part numbers. Of
these, 259 were discovered on the ground (during pre-flight
inspections and other periodic inspections) and 122 were
discovered in-flight. The vast majority of ground dis-
covered malfunctions are repaired on the ground. To
simplify the analysis, it was assumed that all malfunctions
discovered on the ground were also repaired on the ground.
Air discovered malfunctions may be repaired by the IFT
at the time of discovery or repair may be postponed and
affected upon return to the ground. It is reasonable to
assume that some percentage of repair v/ould be achieved
in the air for air discovered malfunctions. Hov/ever,
as indicated by Table VI-4 , none of the 122 air discovered
malfunctions involving part numbers were repaired in-flight.
This represented a significant deficit in the effectiveness
of in-flight maintenance, possibly due to inadequacies of
the IFMK. To further emphasize the importance of this
deficit it should be noted that most of the 69 malfunctions
falling into Malfunction Categories 3, b, and 5 of Table
VT-^ were individually severe enough to have caused a
mission abort or aircraft change if discovered during
pre-flight. These malfunctions, which occurred but were
not repaired in-flight, thus caused large degradations in
ASW capability during missions.
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AVIOHICS rALFUHGTIONS REQUIRING COMPONENT REPLACEMENT
Malfunction Ground Discovered/ Air Discovered














3. Revision of the IFP.IK
In order to determine what sub-systems/components
should be added to or supplemented v/ithin the current
IFMK, the frequency of subsystem/component in-flight failure
and the significance of those failures was examined. Table
VI - 5 indicates the sub-systems/components involved in
the 122 in-flight malfunctions of Table VI - 4, in descend-
ing order of their frequency of occurrence. The significance
of each sub- system/component is indicated by the potential
EAU's recoverable had that sub-system/component been avail-
able to the IFT for immediate replacement. There were 19
sub-systems that failed two or more times during the two
month period examined. Immediate repair of these malfunctions
would have recovered 28.6 EAU's in-flight. In addition, 54
other sub-systems failed once during this period. One-time
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failures from the small sample available were not considered
sufficient justification for augmentation of the IFI-1K. How-
ever, the EAU's recoverable for these additional failures
is large and cannot be overlooked and, therefore, were'
indicated in Table VI-
5
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF EXPANDED IFKK
Sub-system/Component In-Flight Malfunctions EAU's Recoverable
1. APN 187, 2A1 module 14 5.845
2. APN l4l,RT601 7 4.092
3. ARN 52, Phse Dtctr 5 2.087
4. AIC 22, AM4964 5 1.252
5. APS 115, 7A1 module 4 I.670
6. AQA ?, lAseries mdls 4 I.67O
7. APN 141, SA791 3 1.754
8. AQA 7, MX8439 3 1.252
9. APX 76, RT 868 3 1.252
10. ARC 143, 1A1 rndle 2 .835
11. ARC 143, 1A2 rndle 2 .835
12. KW7/KY28, Rmt Cntrl 2 I.I69
13. ASA 66, IP886 2 .835
14. ARR 72, SG791 2 .835
15. AQH 4, L1X8534 2 .835
16. APN 187, RT890 2 .835
17. AIC 22, C8242 2 .501
18. AIC 22, AI.I3364 2 .501
19. ARN 87, CV2059
_2 . 501
SUBTOTAL 68 28.556






4. The Effect of Increased Productivity in Flight
As indicated in Table VI-5, there v/ere a total
of 19 specific sub-systems/components that accounted for
over 28 recoverable EAUs. Therefore, approximately 1^
additional EAUs could be contributed to the in-flight
maintenance productivity of each squadron through the
incorporation or supplementation of these 19 components
in the current IEVIK. The result of this increase of in-
flight EAUs would be a corresponding decrease of 1^ EAUs
in the output required of each squadron's ground maintenance
program. This may make possible reductions in the man-
power requirements in Work Center 210. Based upon the
analysis in Section C of this chapter, the productivity
of the avionics ground personnel was superior to the IFTs
and the cost of an IFT was considerably higher than ground
personnel. In light of these factors it appears most
efficient to begin a reduction in force level v/ith the IFTs.
Determination of the magnitude of this reduction was not
within the scope of this thesis.
5. Limitations
The IFT, because of his skill level and training,
is the one technician in the Avionics Work Center who is
qualified to effect any organizational level repair. It
was concluded that the limiting factor to IFT effectiveness
in-flight was the adequacy to the IFMK. Through discussions
with squadron and COKPATW] maintenance Personnel there
was conveyed a genuine concern for the inadequacy of the
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current 'IFMK aboard the fleet's P3C aircraft. The pro-
ceeding analysis supports this concern. However, the con-
clusions developed are based on a relatively small sample
and cannot be considered conclusive. A similar analysis
examining a longer operational period and additional
squadron maintenance activities could be very useful
in determining the needed inventory adjustments in the
current IFMK. Such an analysis should also include con-
siderations of additional cost, space and weight required
by an expanded IFMK. It should also consider factors
other than IFMK inadequacies which may limit the ability
of the IFT to perform in-flight repairs. Factors such as
the adverse effect on related systems associated v/ith turn-
ing off and trouble-shooting the faulty system and accessi-
bility during flight of the faulty system or component
were beyond the scope of this thesis but should be included
in a complete review of the IFMK.
E. IFT UTILIZATION AT INTERMEDIATE AND DEPOT LEVEL
MA INTENANCE AC TIVITIES
1. General
Since P3C avionics systems are repaired at the
Depot and Intermediate Levels, potential IFT ASW capability
contributions in those areas was investigated. The EAU
was not used as a measure of effectiveness for this
evaluation because of the unavailability of Intermediate
and Depot Level data. For that reason, the examination
of IFT utilization at Intermediate and Depot Level
maintenance activities was qualitative in nature.
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2. IFT Assignment to Intermediate Level Maintenance
Activities
Intermediate Level maintenance is performed at
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AII'Ds).
The AIMD is one of the departments in the organizational
structure of the Naval Air Station from which P3C squadrons
operate. Intermediate Level maintenance is performed by
personnel permanently assigned to the AIMD and "by squadron
ground personnel who are assigned to the AIMD on a temporary
basis. AIMD work centers are organized and staffed in
the same manner as the squadron Maintenance Department
work centers. The AIMD supports the squadron Maintenance
Department through trouble-shooting and repair of those
systems removed from the aircraft by maintenance personnel
within the squadron.
When an item is removed at the squadron, a replace-
ment item is requisitioned from the base Supply Department.
If available, the replacement part is issued to the squadron
immediately. The faulty item may be inducted into the
AIMD for repair on a routine work priority if the AIMD
has the necessary repair capability for that item. If no
replacement is available, the defective item is also in-
ducted into the AIMD for repair but on a higher work priority
If the initial requisition was submitted with a supply
priority of two, which indicates the highest urgency of
need by the squadron for the replacement part, Production
Control personnel at the AIMD would schedule the defective
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component into v/ork immediately. Because of the importance
of priority tv/o items, it is the AIMD policy to call
workers in during off-duty hours, as necessary, to perform
the needed repairs.
Due to the high work priority assigned to urgently
needed avionics systems by AIMD and since there is rarely
any backlog of such items awaiting v/ork, the gains associated
with the assignment of IFTs to Intermediated Level mainten-
ance activities were considered negligible. It was concluded
that the policy of not assigning IFTs to AIMD is satisfactory.
3. IFT Assignment to Denot Level Maintenance Activities
There are systems aboard the VJC whose failure
rates and complexity are such that it v/as not feasible to
establish a repair capability at the local AIMD. Also, there
are occasions on which a system or component is damaged to
such an extent that it may best be repaired at a Depot
Level maintenance activity, even though some repair capabil-
ity exists at the AIIID. These systems, along with defective
sub-assemblies and circuit boards identified and replaced
at the AIMD during normal repair, are shipped to and repaired
at Depot Level maintenance activities.
Depot Level maintenance of airframe and powerplants
items is normally performed at Naval Aircraft Rework
Facilities (NARFs). Periodic aircraft overhaul is also
performed at the NARFs. Depot Level maintenance for the
P3C avionics and electrical systems is performed at individual
equipment contractor sites on 'Repair of Repairable* type
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contracts. Once repaired, the systems, sub-systems and
sub-assemblies are packaged and shipped to the original
requisitioning activities.
The only gain to be made through assignment of
IFTs to a contractor site lies in a potential decrease in
the supply pipeline time from squadron to contractor and
back to the squadron. However, the bulk of the time con-
sumed between an item leaving and returning to the squadron
is comprised of packaging, shipping and transportation
delays, not in contractor repair time. Thus, the potential
for IFT contributions is negligible and IFT assignment







The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate various
methods of avionics maintenance manpower utilization, with
the emphasis placed on the allocation of IFT work effort,
by conducting an analysis of the effectiveness of the
avionics maintenance program in operational P3C squadrons.
In place of using manhour analysis, a traditional method
of measuring worker effectiveness, a new measure of effective-
ness v/as developed. That new measure of effectiveness,
termed the "Equivalent Aircraft Unit" , measured maintenance
productivity in terms of the significance of a malfunction
and the number of malfunctions repaired.
In the course of this analysis, conclusions and recom-
mendations were generated that fall into two general cat-
egories: (1) Those that affect management policies under
the control of squadron Commanding Officers and, (2) Those
that concern policies developed at higher levels of command.
These two categories are discussed below.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SQUADRON POLICY
The Commanding Officer has a great deal of control
concerning the use of personnel once they are assigned to
his squadron. For example, he may effect changes in Work
Center 23 by increasing or decreasing the number and type
of missions on which IFTs must fly. The Commanding Officer
6k

of one squadron examined elected to fly IFTs only on
operational missions, which resulted in more personnel on
the ground working in Work Center 210. However, the
Commanding Officer of another squadron chose to fly IFTs on
all flights, thus decreasing the personnel available to
V/ork Center 210. Evaluation of these policies led to the
following recommendation:
1. The IFT in-flight utilization policy should entail
flying IFTs only on operational missions, with the remainder
of their time spent performing avionics maintenance in
Work Center 210.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY AT HIGHER LEVELS OF COMMANDS
Areas examined that concerned policies made at higher
levels of command included: changing the mix of IFTs and
Permanent Ground Fersonnel assigned to P3C squadrons, utilizing
IFTs at higher levels of maintenance than the Organizational
(squadron) Level, and modifying by addition or deletion,
the standardized items of avionics equipment that constitute
the IFMK. The following recommendations were made:
1. The number of IFTs assigned to a P3C squadron should
be reduced with a corresponding increase in the number of
assigned ground personnel.
2. IFTs should not be assigned to Intermediate and
Depot Level maintenance activities.
3. The IFMK should be augmented by the inclusion of
certain high failure components after consider;-^ion of the
cost, size, and weight of those components.
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D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. The ASW capability contributions of other Maintenance
Department work centers could be evaluated using EAUs as the
measure of effectiveness. This would provide comparability
of the outputs of all work centers.
2. An examination of the IFMK is needed to determine
which specific components should be included based on comp-
onent cost, size, weight and potential contribution to
system capability.
3. A comparison could be made of EAUs and man-hours
to determine which is a better measure of effectiveness
for determining the Maintenance Department's contributions




INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM A MAINTENANCE ACTION FORM
The Maintenance Action Form (MAF) was the source
document for data collection for this thesis. The following
data v/as available on each MAF:
1. JCN-Job Control Number: serializes and identifies
each maintenance action.
2. DISC-When discovered code: identifies when each
malfunction was discovered (pre-flight, in-flight, etc.).
3. ACT-Action taken code: describes the corrective
action required to complete the repair (trouble-shoot, remove
and replace, align, etc.).
k. MAL-Malfunction Code: describes the nature of the
discrepancy (out of tolerance, burned out, shorted, etc.).
5. WUC-Work unit code: identifies the system, sub-
system or component affected by the malfunction (i.e. 1A1
module of AQA-? system).
6. P/N-Part number: utilized only when the repair was
accomplished by the replacement of a part, it identifies
the part removed and replaced.
7. W/C-Work Center-identifies the v/ork center to which
the personnel who repaired the malfunction were assigned.
8. Hi/a-Man-hours: Total man-hours expended during the
repair.
9. Accomplished by/Supervised by- signatures of the
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individuals who performed the repair action (this block
is the only means to differentiate between an IFT working
on the ground and a PGP.
10. Discrepancy-Written description of the malfunction





Tests of Hypotheses in the Classification of Data -
Two hypotheses were tested regarding the placement of
a malfunction within a given Malfunction Significance
Category.
1. Hypothesis: The mean classification of a mal-
function selected at random (x) would be close enough
to the number of a Malfunction Significance Category for
that number to be used as the Mean {/*<>) for all malfunctions
that fall in that category. The hypothesis v/as tested
at the 97-5/S significance level (t = 2.20) by use of
the t-test such that the specific hypothesis (H ) was
YiiM -A and
"t = V^ (x-A, ) (Eq. 1)
S
Where: x = mean classification computed for
a single malfunction
/*# = the number of the Significance
Category concerned
S = standard deviation from A4»
N = total number of respondents = 12
If for example a malfunction has been classified by
the twelve respondents as Category three based on a distribution
0st]p, Bernard, S tatistics in Research , Iowa State
University Press, Ames Iowa, UTA (.1963-)'
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of nine respondents placing the malfunction in Category
Three, two respondents placing the malfunction in Category
Four and the remaining respondent selecting Category Two,
x would "be computed to be 3 '08 and the standard deviation
(S) would be .5. The category number of interest would
be 3 (A» = 3). Utilizing Eq. 1 it is found that
t = 3.08-3.QO VTi = .55
• 5
which falls in t interval of -2.20 to 2.20. Therefore,
c
the hypothesis that the mean classification of the above
malfunction is adequately represented by the Category
number three cannot be rejected.
The above test was conducted for 10 malfunctions with-
in each of the five Malfunction Significance Categories
and the hypothesis (K:// =A.) was accepted for each at
the 97.5/^ significance level.
2. Hypothesis: The dispersion of a malfunction
classifications by the twelve respondents over the avail-
able categories was small enough to justify the utilization
of a specific category as representative of the majority
of the respondents. The measure of dispersion was the
standard deviation of the 12 responses. It was expected
that for the sample of malfunctions examined, the standard
deviations (/*) would be less than .75 at the 95 percent
significance level (t = 1.68). The specific hypothesis
St*










S_ = the standard deviation of the sample
x mean (x)
N = 50
A sample of 50 (N) malfunctions was selected. The
mean of the standard deviations (x) was . 57 » the standard
deviation of the sample means (S— ) equaled .139* Therefore,
t = . 57--7 5
.139
= 1.29
which is less than the t of 1.68. Therefore the hypothesis
c




Chi-Square Test for Significant Differences
The Chi-square test v/as used to test the agreement
between the number of observed malfunctions per category
in Squadron A and B. To investigate the significance of
the difference between the observed frequency of malfunctions
in Squadron A with those observed in Squadron B, the use
of the Chi-square test for goodness of fit was utilized
such that:
2
\ Z = < (A i"B i ) Eq. 1
Where: A/.* = the frequency of malfunctions per
category in Squadron A
B/.\ - frequency of adjusted malfunctions
per category in Squadron B.





= 124.3) and the hypothesis that the difference
between the malfunctions per category in Squadron A and
B was insignificant could not be rejected.
Spiegel, Murray R. , Statistics, McGraw-Hill Book






Relative Capability of IFTs and PGP
In order to evaluate the relative ability of IFTs and
ground personnel to repair different avionics sub-systerns,
an examination was made of sub- system repairs and a deter-
mination made of the percent of repairs for each sub-
system that were performed by the two work groups. This
was accomplished by noting who signed the 'Accomplished by'
and 'Supervised by' block on each MP. If there were ten
repairs for a given system there would be twenty signatures,
ten workers and ten supervisors. If twelve of the signa-
tures were IFTs and eight were ground personnel then IFTs
were considered to have performed 60% of the repairs and
ground personnel the remaining 40/S. The results of the
investigation are shown below:




















System Percent Repaired by
IFTs PGPs
APN-141 .19 .81
Magnetic Tape Trans]:>ort .53 .47
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